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Inspired by Jean-Pierre Meunier and expanding some of his original ideas, 
this article looks at cinematic daydreaming as an act of consciousness 
viewers are sometimes engaged in over and above the perception of the 
f ilm. After def ining the term ‘cinematic daydreaming,’ I distinguish 
three relations the daydream can have to the f ilm. Subsequently, I offer a 
concrete description of the cinematic daydreaming experience by focus-
ing on f ive aspects: (1) the degrees of controllability, (2) the declining 
attentiveness to the perceptual surroundings, (3) the attenuated power 
of the f ilm, (4) the shift into a more private mode, and (5) the distinction 
between intrusive daydreams that interfere with the f ilm and extensive 
daydreams that enrich it.
Keywords: Viewing experience; Jean-Pierre Meunier; mind-wandering; 
ruminating; experimental f ilm; slow cinema
I. Introduction1
Psychologists claim that we spend up to 50% of our waking life daydreaming, 
and on average we experience 2000 daydream segments per day.2 Even 
when we are involved in maximally demanding tasks with high stakes, we 
reportedly devote a minimum rate of 10% to daydreaming.3 Although we 
should be skeptical about such exact quantif ications when it comes to our 
mental life, these astonishingly high numbers might tempt us to assume that 
daydreaming also occurs when we watch a f ilm. And why not? Imagine you 
watch Hou-Hsiao Hsien’s Goodbye, Dragon Inn (2003) or Godfrey Reggio’s 
Hanich, J. and D. Fairfax (eds.), The Structures of the Film Experience by Jean-Pierre Meunier. 
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Koyaanisqatsi (1982) and all of a sudden you realize – and maybe feel a bit 
surprised, annoyed, guilty, or embarrassed upon discovering it – that you 
have spent a considerable amount of time in what Freud once called your 
mind’s private theater. Involuntarily, the inner magician of your mind has 
conjured up for you an effortless flow of visual memories and imaginings: 
your magnif icent trip to Taiwan or the US, the place where you want to 
spend your next holiday, the conference trip that you still need to book, the 
heated discussion you might have with your friends about the f ilm… Your 
perception of the f ilm momentarily receded to the background of attention 
while you were immersed in your own daydream.
Instances like these, which seem to me much more common than usually 
admitted or even realized, have not yet received the attention they deserve 
in f ilm studies. Inspired by Jean-Pierre Meunier’s The Structures of the 
Film Experience (Les Structures de l’expérience filmique: L’identification 
filmique), I will investigate daydreaming as an act of consciousness that 
viewers sometimes are engaged in over and above the perception of the 
f ilm. The article does not provide an exegesis of Meunier’s work or an 
excavation of the origins of his thought, but is meant to showcase how 
some of Meunier’s original ideas can be expanded. As Meunier has shown 
us, our f ilmic consciousness is neither always completely bound to the f ilm, 
nor is it a static affair. What makes his book so valuable is that it points to 
the protean character of f ilmic consciousness, where the f ilm may be the 
center of the viewer’s attention in one moment (f iction consciousness) and 
a mere instigator for memories in another (home-movie consciousness). My 
discussion of cinematic daydreaming will yield further evidence for how 
dynamic and ever-changing the viewer’s consciousness is: we do not at all 
remain locked in one mental state while watching a f ilm but often drift 
off. It speaks to the clear-sightedness of Meunier’s little book that this was 
anything but consensus when it appeared in 1969, a year that marks the 
onset of a period when the dominant strand within f ilm theory began to 
describe the f ilm spectator as a dupe essentially dominated by the medium.
Almost 50 years later, the picture has changed: Meunier and other f ilm 
phenomenologists like Vivian Sobchack have tremendously enriched our 
understanding of what goes on in our conscious, albeit often pre-reflective 
experience of a f ilm. The stream of consciousness – to use an old term by 
William James again en vogue among philosophers of mind – is in a constant 
flux and is remarkably multilayered. Fiction consciousness, documentary 
consciousness, and home-movie consciousness can f luctuate; emotions, 
moods, affects, and various bodily sensations may f low into each other; 
different forms of time, space, and image consciousness can take turns; 
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perceiving, imagining, remembering, and – yes – daydreaming might co-
occur or alternate… While f ilm phenomenologists admit that many facets of 
the f ilm experience occur at the margins of consciousness (partly because 
they are too habituated to attract meta-awareness), they insist that these 
facets are nevertheless part of our conscious experience. Not only can they 
be described – only a proper description allows us to gain a fuller picture 
of the richness of the viewing experience. Not least, a phenomenological 
description raises awareness of what we rarely reflect on. Daydreaming, I 
argue, is precisely such a hardly-ever-noticed act of consciousness.
To be sure, the daydream has been a recurring topos in the history of 
f ilm. Take the Surrealists’ ‘irrational enlargement’ of the f ilm wherein 
the viewer does not follow the ‘rational’ demands of comprehension and 
understanding, but freely follows a spontaneous chain of associations 
initiated by a seemingly irrelevant detail of a f ilm usually suppressed by 
the f ilm’s demands on sense-making.4 As Adrian Martin claims, for the 
Surrealists, the term ‘irrational enlargement’ is “really just their fancy name 
for daydreaming.”5
Theorists have also compared f ilm to daydreaming or drawn an anal-
ogy between the spectator and the daydreamer. In their influential book 
Movies: A Psychological Study from 1950, Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan 
Leites, for instance, claimed that f ilms are the common daydreams of 
a culture.6 In his Theory of Film from 1960, Siegfried Kracauer oscillates 
between the terms “dream” and “daydream”: f ilms supposedly lower the 
viewer’s consciousness and thus invite dreaming, but they also cater to the 
desires and daydreams of their audiences; they can look like dreams and 
contain dreamlike elements that send the audience dreaming, but they 
also make the viewers enter episodes of daydreaming.7 Last but not least, 
we may cite Christian Metz who, in The Imaginary Signifier (1977), claims 
that the f lux of the f iction f ilm and its diegetic character resemble our 
daydreams, and some autobiographical or narcissistic f ilms, which derive 
directly from the daydreams of their authors, are even more like reveries. 
Moreover, the daydreamer and the viewer, due to the “relative lowering of 
wakefulness,” f ind themselves in comparable psychic states. And f inally, 
Metz also diagnoses, in the “social life of our age,” there is a “functional 
competition” between the f iction f ilm and the daydream, where the f ilm 
is often victorious.8
Inversely, we also f ind psychologists who have compared daydreaming 
to watching a f ilm: the daydreamer is likened to a “devout cinemagoer” 
and a melodramatic daydream is described as “a prototypical f ilmic tear-
jerker;” the daydreamer is seen as “camera, f ilm, projector, and screen” at 
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the same time.9 Be that as it may, such comparisons and analogies will not 
occupy me in this essay: I presuppose that watching a f ilm is not identical 
to daydreaming and whether it is similar to it is a question of debate.
Instead, I will take a brief but close look at the viewer’s experience of 
cinematic daydreaming: those passive moments when, in the words of 
Daniel Yacavone, “our attention and concentration wanes, and we mentally 
‘wander away’ from a f ilm and its demands” or when we actively start to 
‘build castles in the air’ by imagining or contemplating a chain of vivid 
scenes related or unrelated to the f ilm.10 Note, however, that I do not want 
to overvalue cinematic daydreaming as a positive act of resistance along 
the lines of Benjaminian distraction or to postulate it as a preferable mode 
of f ilm-watching. My account of the cinematic daydream aims at a detailed 
description, not a normative prescription. As Meunier puts it: “phenomenology 
is above all a method aimed at a description of our immediate experience. 
Renouncing, at least provisionally, the theoretical explanations that reason 
or scientif ic intelligence have been able to construct, it represents a return 
to the lived experience of phenomena […]” (p. 40).
Naturally, we can expect considerable differences in daydreaming prone-
ness among individual viewers. For instance, age seems to be an important 
influencing factor: psychologist Eric Klinger reports f indings which show 
that both vividness and frequency reach their peak during the teens and 
early twenties and then gradually decrease.11 However, these individual 
differences are not something I pursue here. My brief phenomenology will 
focus on cases in which a cinematic daydream actually occurs.
II. Cinematic Daydreaming Defined
Before answering the question what is it like to experience a daydream 
while watching a f ilm, however, we f irst need to define the contours of the 
concept. As late as 2009, Klinger noted that “there has clearly not been a 
consensual def inition.”12 More recently, analytic philosophers like Fabian 
Dorsch, Zachary Irving, and Evan Thompson have tried to conceptualize 
daydreaming and mind-wandering more clearly.13 While I have profited from 
their conceptual rigor, I have opted for a somewhat wider usage of the term. 
In what follows, ‘cinematic daydreaming’ will serve as an umbrella term for 
a host of related phenomena that can occur while watching a f ilm such as 
mind-wandering, ruminating, fantasizing, being lost in thought, building 
castles in the air, drifting off, reverie, and absent-mindedness. The reason 
for uniting this range of different, if similar, phenomena under the umbrella 
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term ‘cinematic daydreaming’ derives from the fact that I primarily want 
to make room for the Meunier-inspired intuition that the f ilm experience 
is not f ilm-devoted pure and simple. However, it is certainly possible – at a 
later stage even desirable – that different variants or subtypes of cinematic 
daydreaming should be distinguished phenomenologically.14
As a working definition, I suggest defining cinematic daydreaming as an 
act of consciousness in which a viewer – voluntarily or involuntarily – enters 
into a chain of sensory presentifications (Vergegenwärtigungen) of something 
that is either absent or non-existent, and which partly removes attention 
from the immediate perceptual surroundings of the viewer and thus draws 
attention, however slightly, away from the f ilm: the imagination-f illed 
perception of the f ilm that philosophers in the wake of Husserl have called 
“image consciousness” is complemented or even pushed aside by other forms 
of consciousness like mind-wandering, ruminating, free-floating imagining, 
etc. Importantly, the chain of sensory presentif ications involved in these 
other acts of consciousness is unguided by the f ilm (even if it can certainly be 
related to it) and is thus at one remove from the film’s perceptual affordances.
The cinematic daydream may be a brief burst of a few seconds, but it can 
also occur in an extended fashion. In either case, it either ends smoothly, 
when the daydream has run its course, or abruptly, when it is somehow 
interrupted. It can involve a pleasurable form of free-floating imagining, 
but it can also involve displeasure and annoyance when the daydream 
comes in the form of a worrying rumination or is considered, afterward, as 
having interrupted the f ilm experience. It can involve the past, the future, 
hypothetical things, but also the here and now of the viewing environ-
ment – for example, when the erotic atmosphere of the cinema inspires a 
viewer to fantasize.
What is more, the temporal dynamics of cinematic daydreaming implies 
a chain of imaginings, memories, or thoughts – often (but not necessarily 
always) moving from one topic to another.15 Take Eric Rohmer’s Cahiers 
du Cinéma review of Rossellini’s Voyage to Italy (1954), in which the future 
nouvelle vague director remembers how his “imagination was wandering 
about” and how he felt plunged “into very absurd reflections”:
I confess that I have, while I was watching the f ilm, made reflections 
far removed from the drama itself; in the manner of a spectator who, 
entering the cinema between two meetings, and more concerned with 
his business than the show, is surprised to try to read the time on the 
watch that an actor wears on his wrist.16
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Moving freely from f iction consciousness to documentary consciousness 
and beyond, Rohmer recognizes the patterns on George Sanders’s jacket, 
wonders about the actor’s age and how much older he has grown since 
Rebecca (1940) and All About Eve (1950), ref lects on the haircut of Ingrid 
Bergman, considers the different structures of the skulls in the catacombs, 
and ponders new methods of archeology.
Note, however, that it is not easy to draw a strict line between daydream-
ing and imagining.17 In my broad understanding, free-floating imagining 
should be considered a form of daydreaming, whereas imagining steered 
from outside is not. The latter would be the case when someone tells you 
to imagine something, when a book guides your imagination, or when a 
f ilm makes you mentally visualize something. It is easier to distinguish 
daydreaming from other mental states. Dreams, hypnagogia, fever dreams, 
hallucinations, deliberate problem-solving thoughts, and memories must 
not be confused with daydreams (even though memories, for instance, can 
certainly become part of daydreams).18
III. The Cinematic Daydream and Its Relation to the Film
The exact contents of spectators’ daydreams – what they daydream about 
while watching a f ilm – are too varied and idiosyncratic to dwell on here. 
It seems that, in principle, everything a person may daydream in everyday 
life can also become the content of a daydream during a f ilm. More relevant 
for a phenomenology of cinematic daydreaming is the daydream’s relation 
to the f ilm. Here, we can broadly distinguish three types.
First, the daydream is directly linked to the f ilm: just like Rohmer in the 
example above, the viewer daydreams about the f ilm – its narrative, its 
characters, its world, its creators, its actors, its special effects. A viewer may 
briefly stray away from narrative absorption and daydream about how Max 
Ophüls and his cameraman Christian Matras f ilmed the opening sequence 
shot of La Ronde (1950): how must the set have looked to move the camera 
so elegantly for so long and how did Ophüls and Matras interact with their 
actors and extras during the shooting of the scene?
A viewer may also engage in a reverie about what it would be like to live in 
the world depicted in Byambasuren Davaa and Luigi Falorni’s documentary 
The Story of the Weeping Camel (2003): what would he do when confronted 
with – what for him comes across as – the monotonies and hardships of 
a monadic life in the Mongolian Gobi region?19 Similarly, when I recently 
watched Koyaanisqatsi, I caught myself wondering about the people whose 
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intense, quizzical faces Ron Fricke’s camera captures in slow-motion on the 
streets of New York: what has happened to these people in the intermittent 
35 years, are they still alive, and what do they look like today? (I also came 
to realize that Roland Barthes had asked similar questions when looking 
at André Kertész’s photograph of little Ernest from 1931: “Is it possible that 
Ernest is still alive today: but where? how? What a novel!”)20 
However, as much as these instances of daydreaming are linked to the 
f ilm, it is important to distinguish them from what I have elsewhere called 
“bounded imagination” (and what Elaine Scarry dubs “imagination-under-
authorial-instruction”): moments when the f ilm seems to invite – or even 
force – us to imagine something it does not show, but strongly suggests.21 
In this case, the intertwinement of the viewer’s act of consciousness and 
the f ilm as aesthetic object are differently structured, since the viewer’s 
imagining seems necessary to concretize the f ilm fully and thus to turn 
it from a work of art into an aesthetic object (in the sense def ined by the 
phenomenological aesthetics of, for instance, Roman Ingarden).22
Second, the daydream can be indirectly linked to the f ilm: the f ilm 
somehow incites the daydream, but its narrative, characters, world, creators, 
actors, or special effects do not themselves play a role in it. Think of a viewer 
watching a sadly moving melodrama that sparks thoughts about the future 
Fig. 14: The opening scene of Max ophüls’s La Ronde with anton walbrook.
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death of the viewer’s grandmother, father, brother, or daughter: the viewer’s 
thoughts are carried away and he begins to daydream about the funeral, the 
speech of a close relative, the deep feeling of loss wearing him down and 
so on. Or think of a young viewer who watches a horror f ilm alone at home 
while his parents are out for a party: the f ilm turns the dark living room 
into an unsafe, threatening place that sparks fearful daydreams of burglars 
outside the window, a looming monster in the creaking wardrobe, and an 
ensuing f ight for survival. Not least, the politics of an engagé documentary 
such as An Inconvenient Truth (2006) or I Am Not Your Negro (2016) may all 
of a sudden remind a viewer that he always wanted to be more active in 
environmental matters or anti-racist campaigns, and he begins to think 
about what steps to take the following days.
The third type of relation comprises all those daydreams that are not at 
all linked to the f ilm, when the viewer is carried away into foreign territory 
entirely unconnected to the movie.23 Consider this: you start watching 
the f ilm after a meeting in which you made a stupid mistake, or you had a 
heated debate with your best friend in which he insulted you in an unusual 
way. You try to focus on what is happening on the screen, but your thoughts 
keep drifting off, wandering back to that mistake or insult and the way you 
should have behaved. Or, while watching Andy Warhol’s Haircut (1963) or 
Eat (1964), your mind begins to wander: from the dinner afterwards … to the 
Christmas presents you have to buy … to the tennis match that you want 
to watch on Friday to … alas … many other things. While we might claim 
that Haircut or Eat’s monotony in some sense ‘incites’ a flight from boredom 
via fancy (the f ilm would thus be indirectly related to the daydream after 
Fig. 15: Some passersby in Godfrey reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi.
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all), it may be better to speak of the f ilm as the reason for daydreaming and 
not its cause. The viewer’s daydream occurs in order to escape the f ilm’s 
monotony, but the f ilm does not set it off.
Meunier, for his part, has shown us how the viewer’s dependence on 
the f ilmic images varies between the f ilmic modes: while the home movie 
makes us look beyond the screen to existing, previously experienced reality, 
the non-existing, autonomous reality of the f iction f ilm demands that our 
attention is focused on the screen. Analogously, cinematic daydreaming 
can be linked directly or indirectly to the f ilm, or not at all.
IV. The Experience of the Cinematic Daydream
Let us now move on to a more concrete description of the experience of 
cinematic daydreaming. I will focus on five aspects: (1) the degrees of control-
lability, (2) the declining attentiveness to the perceptual surroundings, (3) 
the attenuated power of the f ilm, (4) the shift into a more private mode, and 
(5) intrusive daydreams that interfere with the f ilm vs. extensive daydreams 
that enrich it.
1. Degrees of Controllability: Active vs. Passive Daydreaming
Cinematic daydreaming can be actively and voluntarily initiated and 
pursued. Take the example from La Ronde: precisely because I am actively 
following the f ilm, I am seriously interested in f inding out how Ophüls 
and Matras have staged the opening scene. I actively, with a certain effort 
and multitaskingly, pursue these thoughts and visually presentify to me 
the potential scenarios in a comparatively vivid way. Hence, my presen-
tif ications are not ‘gray’ inferences or abstract hypotheses, but ‘colorful’ 
daydreams that accompany my perception of the f ilm. Not everyone 
would agree with such an inclusive position, though. Dieter Lohmar, 
for instance, argues that, while daydreams can be actively initiated, we 
subsequently have to give ourselves over passively to their unfolding.24 
Others, like Elaine Scarry, def ine daydreams as voluntary: “Indeed it 
would be hard to see – given its fadedness and other failings – why we 
would devote ourselves to this ghostly practice if it did not have the virtue 
of the voluntary.”25
However, Scarry’s position seems too one-sided to me: it f lies in the face 
of the worrying and ruminating daydreams that keep creeping into our 
ongoing activities involuntarily. Surely, daydreams can also passively and 
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involuntarily overcome me. In this case, the mind seems to take over from 
the self without me realizing it at f irst. Zachary Irving draws attention to 
grammatical constructions we use in which the subject is not a human 
agent: “we would say ‘my mind was wandering’ or ‘Luke’s mind wandered’ 
rather than ‘I was mind-wandering’ or ‘Luke mind-wandered.’ […] when 
our minds wander, we don’t feel responsible for our thoughts; our minds 
are what wanders, not us.”26 Here, the daydreams occur effortlessly and 
unguided, and I glide into them unknowingly: “Frequently we realize that 
we are engaging in these acts only after we have been indulging in them 
for some time. By a sort of psychic repercussion, we f ind ourselves caught 
in their midst – in medias imagines, as it were,” Edward Casey writes.27 
Frequently, such moments of ‘waking up’ from the daydream come with an 
emotional response. We may be surprised or annoyed by our own reverie 
when we realize we have missed important parts of the f ilm (as, in contrast 
to reading a book, we cannot go back, at least when we sit in a cinema 
where the movie progresses relentlessly). Alternatively, we may feel guilty 
or embarrassed, especially when a friend or neighbor nudges us, whispers 
to us, and points out something on the screen we have overlooked because 
we were too deeply sunk in our own daydreams.
2. Declining Attentiveness to the External Perceptible 
Surroundings
As Irving notes, daydreaming is a conscious experience: “This is intuitive: 
when a person’s mind wanders, the lights don’t go out. Rather, she experi-
ences a stream of memories, imaginings, inner speech etc.”28 Similarly, 
Gaston Bachelard observes that the “night dream is a dream without a 
dreamer. On the contrary, the dreamer of reverie remains conscious enough 
to say: it is I who dream the reverie, happy with this leisure in which I no 
longer have the task of thinking.”29 Since the daydream occupies conscious-
ness at least to some degree, the daydreamer becomes less aware of the 
perceptible surroundings: even though we can certainly watch a f ilm and 
concurrently fall into an episode of daydreaming, daydreaming always 
backgrounds perception, however minimally.
Here we can distinguish various degrees of visual intensity, of trans-
parency or obliqueness: from the weak and vague daydream that allows 
you to ‘see through’ it to the strong and concrete type that almost fully 
‘blocks’ your perception of the f ilm (to a lesser degree, this is also the case 
for the auditory intensity of the daydream). Hence, the more the daydream 
dominates consciousness, the more the f ilm is relegated to the fringes of 
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consciousness, even if one still ‘picks up’ visual (and auditory) information. 
With regard to f ilmic imagining, I have elsewhere spoken of episodes of 
‘mental superimposition’ or ‘mental double-exposure.’30 We can also utilize 
these metaphors for the daydream: the concurrent perception of f ilmic 
images and the daydream are, as it were, layered on top of each other. 
The more the f ilm and the daydream are part of the f ield of conscious-
ness the more we can say the viewer is engaged in a form of multitasking: 
watching the f ilm and daydreaming at the same time. What is more, while 
daydreaming, the viewer is suspended between three different worlds: (a) 
the physical world of the cinema or any other viewing surrounding, (b) the 
filmic world (which may or may not be f ictional), and (c) the mental world of 
the daydream. Depending on the strength of the daydream, the locatedness 
in these three worlds varies.
3. The Attenuated Power of the Film
Since daydreaming backgrounds perception, at least minimally, we experi-
ence the f ilm as wielding much less power over us than in moments of 
intensif ied absorption (such as deep f ictional immersion and awe-inspiring 
aesthetic enthrallment).31 In fact, cinematic daydreaming occurs in moments 
when the f ilm seems to be bereft of its ‘grip’ over us. This can be for many 
reasons. First, the f ilm unintentionally does not ‘captivate’ us any longer 
(or has not been ‘gripping’ to begin with) and our attention starts to drift 
off. Second, we can ‘wrest’ ourselves actively from the f ilm by initiating an 
episode of daydreaming when we think this is more appropriate, or we are 
‘torn away’ passively from the f ilm by penetrating thoughts that interfere 
with the f ilm experience. Third, the attenuated power of the f ilm can also 
intentionally derive from its aesthetics, an aesthetics that does not want to 
‘chain’ us to its narrative and style but grants us more freedom to drift off 
into daydreaming. Below, we will see how some experimental f ilms seem 
to invite episodes of daydreaming, but we could also think of slow cinema. 
As Eric Rohmer remarks in his review, Rossellini’s f ilm allowed him “absurd 
reflections […] of which a more sustained tempo in the plot would not have 
left me the leisure.”32
This attenuated power of the f ilm can be experienced as liberating, 
but it can also imply constraints and frustration. Not feeling guided and 
captivated by a f ilm may result in disagreeable boredom; and when we 
seem to be under the ‘spell’ of our wandering mind, which strays away 
even though we actually would like to follow the f ilm, we may regret the 
lack of power of the f ilm.
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4. A Shift into Privacy
The daydream also implies an abandonment, however minimal, of the 
outside world and a shift into a more private realm. This aspect of privacy 
has two components. First, watching a f ilm entails perceiving something 
that is outside of me. It is clearly located beyond myself, there on the screen. 
The daydream, instead, is experienced as much closer to me, almost ‘inside’ 
of me. As Bachelard puts it: “Truly inhabiting the whole volume of his space, 
the man of reverie is from anywhere in his world, in an inside which has 
no outside. It is not without reason that people commonly say that the 
dreamer is plunged in his reverie. The world no longer poses any opposition 
to him.”33 To be sure, the talk of an ‘inside’ is not without its problems. 
What Edward Casey notes about imagining also goes for daydreaming: 
“Far from inhabiting a concrete setting, imagined possibilities are typically 
projected into a spatio-temporal limbo that is felt to be neither external nor 
internal to the imaginer.”34 Still, the daydream is more private because we 
know that – unlike the perceivable images and sounds of the f ilm – it is not 
available to others. The daydream constitutes a world decidedly not shared 
by others (hence the well-known feeling of being excluded from someone 
else’s world who is ‘lost in his thoughts’). There is no shared daydreaming 
of the same content.
Second, the daydream is also private in the sense that it is a world in 
some way connected to me and my own identity: it is f illed with what I 
personally daydream about. Eric Klinger writes: “Most people view their 
daydreams as very private affairs that they feel less comfortable describing 
to other people than when they are describing their real experiences.”35 At 
the same time, this does not imply that one has fully lost contact with the 
here and now of one’s viewing surroundings. Unlike in dreaming proper, 
the f ilm is relegated to the margins of consciousness at best, but it is still 
somehow ‘gleaming’ or ‘shimmering.’
Still, even in cases of f ilm-related daydreaming, personal elements from 
outside the f ilm itself ‘adhere’ to it, ‘cluster’ around its images, ‘push’ it from 
the center of consciousness: our mundane joys, hopes, concerns, worries or 
anxieties are invited into – or force themselves upon – our f ilm experience.
5. Intrusion vs. Extension of the Film Experience
Expressions like ‘seeing through’ the daydream, the daydream ‘blocking’ 
perception, or Casey’s in medias imagines hint at the intermediary char-
acter of daydreams: their in-betweenness. The daydream can therefore be 
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experienced – in retrospect – as an intruder: It is as if the daydream has 
pushed itself ‘between’ you and the f ilm and has created a barrier for your 
smooth perception of the f ilm. Take this not-so-unusual example. While 
you would like to focus on the f ilm, your mind keeps drifting away to a 
potential revenge scenario: how can you pay back the massive annoyance of 
the person sitting behind you in the cinema, who answered your request to 
stop kicking against your chair with an extremely impertinent remark? You 
play through various possibilities to get even, from informing the cinema 
manager to throwing the content of your f ive-liter cup of popcorn at him. 
The more the daydream is experienced as intrusive, the more it will be 
considered as a form of distraction, almost like the annoying neighbor 
sitting behind you.
But there are two reasons why daydreaming may be experienced as 
quite the opposite of distraction and intrusion. First, from the viewer’s 
perspective, daydreaming may be very welcome. Think of drifting back to 
the extremely positive email you received before starting to watch the f ilm 
and the pleasurable trains of thought it initiates for you. Hence, any negative 
definition of daydreaming as “an occurrence of thoughts […] unrelated to the 
task being carried out at the moment of their occurrence,” as Stawarczyk et 
al. put it, must be rejected as too sweeping.36 Instead, with Irving/Thompson, 
we can claim that “individuals switch tasks when their minds begin to 
wander.”37 For the viewer-turned-daydreamer, the daydream thus becomes 
the main task carried out at the moment, before the film gains predominance 
again and the daydreamer transforms back into his role of focused viewer 
just an instant later. Or consider the case of an utterly boring moment 
during a f ilm – the umpteenth action sequence in a superhero movie, for 
instance – wherein daydreaming can come as a momentary exit strategy 
from boredom’s imprisonment. This is another lesson to be learned from 
Meunier’s book: Just like the home-movie consciousness that “looks beyond 
the image, to the person-in-general that it depicts, in order to produce and 
maintain his existence even during the screening” (p. 88), the daydream 
consciousness leads the viewer beyond the image into a stream of private 
thoughts and imaginings. The former evokes the act of remembering, the 
latter the act of daydreaming.
Second, daydreaming may also be considered an intentional goal of the 
f ilm – or at least one may feel legitimized and even encouraged to enter 
daydreaming episodes by the f ilm’s aesthetics. Think of Paul Sharits and 
his f licker f ilm N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968): for Sharits, it was an explicit goal to let 
the viewer reach “totally new levels of awareness,” as he put it. He claims 
to have based the color development of the f ilm on the Tibetan Mandala of 
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the Five Dhyani Buddhas “which is used in meditation to reach the highest 
level of inner consciousness”: “I am not at all interested in the mystical 
symbolism of Buddhism, only in its strong, intuitively developed imagistic 
power.”38 While it is not clear what exactly Sharits means by “new levels of 
awareness,” “highest level of inner consciousness,” and “imagistic power” 
(the f ilm is certainly close to the drug experiments of the 1960s and the 
counter-cultural interest in Buddhist meditation), we can assume that he 
would not have been averse to a daydreaming viewer.
In fact, we can create a whole list of canonical experimental f ilms whose 
explicit purpose – or at least implicit invitation – seems to involve daydream-
ing: Empire (1964), The Flicker (1965), Wavelength (1967), RR (2007)… Some 
cases of slow cinema – for instance, f ilms by Tsai Ming-Liang, Albert Serra, 
or Apichatpong Weerasethakul – equally seem to open themselves up to 
daydreaming viewers. These f ilms ‘harness’ the viewer’s daydreams: the 
perception of the f ilm is extended and enriched by the viewer’s drifting 
mind.39 To round off this brief phenomenology of cinematic daydreaming, 
we could therefore distinguish between intrusive and extensive daydreams. 
On the one hand, there are reveries that lead us entirely away from the f ilm 
into the mundane. On the other hand, we f ind daydreams that extend the 
world of the f ilm – and thus immerse us even deeper in its world.
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